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To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue,
Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and
proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for
primeval games: the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule. In this
paper, we provide a non-cooperative approach to address these problems more speci¯cally.
Inspired by the generalized bidding approach (Ju and Wettstein (2006)) for TU games,
we design various bidding mechanisms to ¯t the model of primeval games and show that
each implements the corresponding compensation rule in subgame perfect equilibrium.
These mechanisms require nearly no condition on the game environment and obtain each
solution itself rather than in expected terms. Moreover, since the various mechanisms
share a common basic structure, this paper o®ers a non-cooperative benchmark to compare
di®erent axiomatic solutions, which, in return, may advance the axiomatic study of the
issue by constructing alternative compensation rules.
JEL classi¯cation codes: C71; C72; D62; D63.
Subject classi¯cation: 91A06; 91A10; 91A12.
Keywords: externality; compensation; primeval games; marginalistic rule; concession
rule; primeval rule; bidding mechanism; implementation.1 Introduction
This paper provides a non-cooperative game theoretic approach to analyze the compensa-
tion issue in environments features by inter-individual externalities.
A negative externality arises when an (economic) agent undertakes an action that has
an e®ect that turns out to be a cost imposed on another agent. When agents bene¯t from
an activity in which they are not directly involved, the e®ect is called a positive externality.
An associated fundamental question in real life is how to compensate the losses incurred by
the negative externalities. Despite relatively less attention, the issue of paying for positive
externalities is not trivial, as suggested by free-rider problems.
In economics, the issue of externality has been studied, to name a few, by Pigou (1920),
Coase (1960)), Arrow (1970), and Varian (1994), which mainly aims to attain e±ciency
rather than focusing on normative standards.
The game theory literature on externality begins with Thrall and Lucas (1963) by the
concept of partition function form games: a partition function assigns a value to each pair
consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which includes that coalition. Therefore,
solving an externality-incurred compensation problem boils down to recommending rules or
solutions for such games, which stresses the normative aspects of the issue. Some existing
solution concepts can be found, among others, in Myerson (1977), Bolger (1986), Feldman
(1994), Potter (2000), Pham Do and Norde (2002), Maskin (2003), Macho-Stadler, P¶ erez-
Castrillo, and Wettstein (2004), and Ju (2004).
As one may observe, however, the framework of partition function form games does not
model the externalities among individuals but restrict to speci¯c coalitional e®ects. This
is due to the fact, as is argued in Ju and Borm (2005), that both partition function form
games and the standard TU (transferable utility) games always assume that all players in
the player set N are present even if they do not form a coalition.
To deal with this open problem, i.e., how to compensate agents in the context of inter-
individual externalities, Ju and Borm (2005) constructs a new class of games, primeval
games. By considering a player's initial situation (no other players, in an absolute stand-
alone sense) and other similar situations where only a subgroup of players are present
(being active), primeval games model the externalities among individual players in all
possible cases with respect to the active players. Employing an axiomatic approach, Ju
and Borm (2005) proposes three compensation rules: the marginalistic rule, the conces-
sion rule, and the primeval rule, which may serve as speci¯c benchmarks to solve the
externality-associated compensation problems. Ju and Borm (2005) further characterizes
the marginalistic rule and the concession rule. By discussing several desirable properties
and comparing it with the ¯rst two rules, they argue that the primeval rule is more promis-
1ing in the context of primeval games although a full axiomatic characterization remains
open.
In this paper, we study the compensation problem within the framework of primeval
games from a non-cooperative perspective. Inspired by the bidding mechanism ¯rst intro-
duced by P¶ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) and the idea of generalized bidding approach
(cf. Ju and Wettstein (2006)) to implement cooperative solutions for TU games, we con-
struct a non-cooperative foundation to the above three compensation rules by designing
various bidding mechanisms, adapting to primeval games, that di®er in the role played
(that is, the responsibility for externality e®ects assumed) by the proposer chosen through
a bidding process. A desirable feature of these mechanisms is that they require nearly no
condition on the game environment. Furthermore, these mechanisms obtain in subgame
perfect equilibrium the prescribed outcome of each compensation rule itself rather than in
expected terms.
To employ such a strategic approach not only helps to make the analysis of the com-
pensation issue more speci¯c, but also highlights the di®erent \non-cooperative" rationales
underlying the various compensation rules. Since these bidding mechanisms share a simi-
lar basic structure and same spirit in the game design but vary in details according to the
speci¯c compensation rule being implemented, they constitute a consistent benchmark for
analyzing and comparing di®erent normative solutions for primeval games from a strategic
point of view.
In addition to this section introducing the paper brie°y, the remaining part has the
following structure. The next section presents the general model of primeval games and
the compensation rules to be implemented. In Section 3, we describe the various bidding
mechanisms and show that they implement the di®erent compensation rules in subgame
perfect equilibrium. The ¯nal section concludes the paper by brie°y discussing the possible
extensions of the mechanisms, which o®ers a direction to ¯nd new compensation rules.
2 Primeval games and the compensation rules
A primeval game, according to Ju and Borm (2005), is de¯ned as follows. Let N =
f1;2;:::;ng be the ¯nite set of players. A subset S of N is called a group of individuals
(in short, a group1 S). A pair (i;S) that consists of a player i and a group S of N to
which i belongs is called an embedded player in S. The set of embedded players is denoted
by E(N) =
©
(i;S) 2 N £ 2Nji 2 S
ª
. A mapping u : E(N) ¡! R that assigns a real
1Here the term of group is used in order to be distinguished from the usual concept of coalition in the
framework of TU games.
2value u(i;S) to each embedded player (i;S) is an individual-group function or a primeval
function. The ordered pair (N;u) is called a primeval game. The set of primeval games
with player set N is denoted by PRIN.
The value u(i;S) represents the payo®, or utility, of player i, given that all players in
S are present while all players in NnS are absent. Hence, the model of primeval games
does not consider the phenomenon of cooperation and, therefore, the individual numbers
with respect to subgroups are not the result of internal negotiations among the players
involved: They just model the consequences of individual externalities due to the presence
of others. For a given group S and an individual-group function u, let ¹ u(S) denote the
vector (u(i;S))i2S. We call ¹ u(N) the status quo of a primeval game u, and u(i;fig) the
absolute stand-alone payo®, or the Rubinson Crusoe payo® (in short, R-C payo®) of player
i in game u.
The model of primeval games assumes that all players have the right to be in a game,
which, however, does not necessarily mean that a player has the right to a®ect the others.
Therefore, ¹ u(N) is the situation in question within the context of primeval games: Players
have to accommodate each other but may not be satis¯ed with the status quo due to the
presence of externalities. To smooth out the possible con°icts, allowing players to make
compensations according to a reasonable rule would help.
A (compensation) rule on PRIN is a function f, which associates with each primeval
game (N;u) in PRIN a vector f(N;u) = (fi(N;u))i2N 2 RN of individual payo®s.
Following an axiomatic approach, Ju and Borm (2005) proposes and analyzes three
compensation rules, the marginalistic rule, the concession rule, and the primeval rule, to
solve the externality associated compensation problem.
For a primeval game u 2 PRIN, let ¦(N) be the set of all bijections ¾ : f1;:::;jNjg ¡!
N. For a given ¾ 2 ¦(N) and k 2 f1;:::;jNjg we de¯ne S¾
k = f¾(1);:::;¾(k)g and S¾
0 = ;.























if k 2 f2;:::;jNjg:
To introduce the concession rule, we ¯rst de¯ne player ¾(k)'s concession payo® for the

































¾(k)(u) if k = f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
u(¾(jNj);N) + P¾
¾(jNj)(u) if k = jNj:








Ju and Borm (2005) shows that the outcome prescribed by the concession rule turns
out to be the average of the status quo payo® vector and the outcome of the marginalistic








for all i 2 N.










































¾(k)(u) if k 2 f2;:::;jNj ¡ 1g
u(¾(jNj);N) ¡ L¾
¾(jNj)(u) if k = jNj:








43 Implementing the compensation rules by bidding
mechanisms
In this section, we will study the three compensation rules from a strategic perspective,
inspired by the generalized bidding approach to construct the non-cooperative foundation
for various cooperative solution concepts for TU games as proposed by Ju and Wettstein
(2006). Below we will introduce three main bidding mechanisms and show that each
implements in subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) a speci¯c compensation rule de¯ned in
the above section.
The basic bidding mechanism can be described informally as follows: At stage 1 the
players bid to choose a proposer. Each player bids by submitting an (jNj ¡ 1)-tuple of
numbers (positive or negative), one number for each player (excluding herself). The player
for whom the net bid (the di®erence between the sum of bids made by the player and the
sum of bids the other players made to her) is the highest is chosen as the proposer. Before
moving to stage 2, the proposer pays to each player the bid she made. So at this stage,
the net bid is used to measure a player' willingness to become the proposer (and therefore,
to measure the willingness to make a proposal how to solve the compensation problem).
As a reward to the chosen proposer for her e®ort (represented by her net bid), she has
the right to make a scheme how to compensate among all the players in the next stage.
At stage 2 the proposer makes such a scheme, i.e., o®ers a vector of payments to all other
players. The o®er is accepted if all the other players agree. In case of acceptance the game
stops such that the proposer collects
P
i2N u(i;N) and pays out the o®ers made. In case
of rejection all the players other than the proposer play a new game which has the same
structure and rule as the previous one whereas the only di®erence is that the remaining
players bargain over their prescribed payo®s in the situation where the proposer does not
exist, and the proposer gets her status quo payo® and pays all other players their payo®
di®erences in these two situations, i.e., with the proposer and without the proposer, so as
to compensate the externality e®ects caused by the existence of the proposer. Hence, the
key feature of this mechanism is that when the o®er is rejected, the proposer is required
to assume the full responsibility for any externality, no matter whether it is negative or
positive, on all other players to make sure that they get what they can obtain as if in the
situation without the proposer.
We now formally describe the bidding mechanism (game) that implements the mar-
ginalistic rule.2
2Because of the relationship between the marginalistic rule and the Shapley value as noted by Ju and
Borm (2005), one can ¯nd the similarity between this mechanism and the one implementing the Shapley
5Mechanism A. If there is only one player fig, she receives her R-C payo®, u(i;fig). When
there are two or more players, the mechanism is de¯ned recursively. Given the rules of
the mechanism for at most jNj¡1 players, the mechanism for N = f1;:::;ng proceeds in
three stages.
Stage 1: Each player i 2 N makes jNj ¡ 1 bids bi
j 2 R with j 6= i. Hence, at this stage, a
strategy for player i is a vector (bi
j)j6=i.







i. Let i¤ =
argmaxi(Bi) where an arbitrary tie-breaking rule is used in case of a non-unique maxi-
mizer. Once the winner i¤ has been chosen, player i¤ pays every player j 2 Nnfi¤g, bi¤
j .
Stage 2: Player i¤ makes a vector of o®ers xi¤
j 2 R to every player j 2 Nnfi¤g.
Stage 3: The players other than i¤, sequentially, either accept or reject the o®er. If a player
rejects it, then the o®er is rejected. Otherwise, the o®er is accepted.
If the o®er is accepted, which means that all players agree with the proposer on the scheme
of compensating each other, then each player j 2 Nnfi¤g receives xi¤






j . Hence, the ¯nal payo® to player j 6= i¤ is
xi¤
j + bi¤









If the o®er of the proposer i¤ is rejected, i¤ is requested to leave the game with her payo®
u(i¤;N) but pay each of the other players the di®erence between his or her payo® in the sit-
uation where i¤ does not exist and the current payo®, i.e., u(j;Nnfi¤g)¡u(j;N) for all j 2
Nnfi¤g. Meanwhile, all players other than i¤ proceed to play a similar game with one player
less, i.e., with the set of players Nnfi¤g and the status quo as ¹ u(Nnfi¤g). Formally, this
game is de¯ned as (Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) where ujNnfi¤g(j;S) = u(j;S) for all S ½ Nnfi¤g and
j 2 S. Thus, player i¤ receives u(i¤;N) +
P
j6=i¤ (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)) from this stage.
The ¯nal payo® to player i¤ is then u(i¤;N) +
P




The ¯nal payo® to any player j 6= i¤ is the payo® he obtains in the game played by Nnfi¤g
plus the bid bi¤
j .
Below we show that for any primeval game, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
of Mechanism A coincide with the payo® vector as prescribed by the marginalistic rule.
value in Ju and Wettstein (2006). However, since the marginalistic rule has a di®erent interpretation and
due to the fact that no counterparts of the concession rule and the primeval rule exist in TU games, it
is necessary to give a full description of this mechanism and provide the complete proof of Theorem 3.1,
which will also help to save spaces when analyzing the other two compensation rules.
6Theorem 3.1 Mechanism A implements in SPE the outcome prescribed by the marginal-
istic rule of an arbitrary primeval game (N;u).
Proof.
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of players jNj. It is easy to see that the
theorem holds for jNj = 1. We assume that it holds for all jMj · jNj ¡ 1 and show that
it is satis¯ed for jNj.
First we show that the outcome of the marginalistic rule is an SPE outcome. We explicitly
construct an SPE that yields the outcome prescribed by the marginalistic rule as an SPE
outcome. Consider the following strategies:
At stage 1, each player i, i 2 N, announces bi
j = ©j(N;u) ¡ ©j(Nnfig;ujNnfig), for
every j 2 Nnfig.
At stage 2, a proposer, player i¤, o®ers xi¤
j = ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) to every j 2 Nnfi¤g.
At stage 3, any player j 2 Nnfi¤g accepts any o®er which is greater than or equal to
©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) and rejects any o®er strictly less than ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g).
Clearly these strategies yield the marginalistic rule outcome for any player who is not the
proposer, since bi¤
j + xi¤
j = ©j(N;u), for all j 6= i¤. Moreover, given that following the
strategies the o®er is accepted by all players, the proposer also obtains her payo® speci¯ed
by the marginalistic rule.
Here we want note that all net bids Bi equal to zero because for all i;j 2 N
©i(N;u) ¡ ©i(Nnfjg;ujNnfjg) = ©j(N;u) ¡ ©j(Nnfig;ujNnfig) (2)
which can be readily veri¯ed along the same lines to prove the balanced contribution
property (see Myerson (1980)) of the Shapley value for TU games.
To show that the previous strategies constitute an SPE, note ¯rst that the strategies at
stages 2 and 3 are best responses:3 In case of rejection a proposer i¤ obtains u(i¤;N) +
P
j6=i¤ (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)) and all other players play the bidding mechanism with
player set Nnfi¤g. By the induction hypothesis, we have the marginalistic rule out-
come as the equilibrium outcome of this game, i.e., each player j 2 Nnfi¤g receiving
©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g). Consider now the strategies at stage 1. If a player i increases her to-
tal bid, then she will be chosen as the proposer with certainty, but her payo® will decrease.
If she decreases her total bid another player will propose and player i's payo® would still
3We want to note that this result holds for any arbitrary primeval game (N;u) and does not require
any special condition like the zero-monotonicity on the game environment.
7equal to her payo® prescribed by the marginalistic rule. Finally, any change in her bids
that leaves the total bid constant will in°uence the identity of the proposer but will not
a®ect player i's payo®.
The proof that any SPE yields the marginalistic rule outcome proceeds by a series of claims.
Claim (a). In any SPE, at stage 3, all players other than the proposer i¤ accept the o®er
if xi¤
j > ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) for every j 6= i¤. Otherwise, if xi¤
j < ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) for
at least some j 6= i¤, then the o®er is rejected.
Note that if an o®er made by the proposer i¤ is rejected at stage 3, by the induction hypoth-
esis, the payo® to a player j 6= i¤ is ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g). We denote the last player that
has to decide whether to accept or reject the o®er by ¯. If the game reaches ¯, i.e., there
has been no previous rejection, her optimal strategy involves accepting any o®er higher
than ©¯(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) and rejecting any o®er lower than ©¯(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g). The
second to last player, denoted by ¯ ¡1, anticipates the reaction of player ¯. So, ¯ ¡1 will
accept the o®er when the game reaches him with xi¤
¯¡1 > ©¯¡1(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) and xi¤
¯ >
©¯(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g). If xi¤
¯¡1 < ©¯¡1(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) and xi¤
¯ > ©¯(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g),
player ¯ ¡ 1 will reject the o®er. If ¯ ¡ 1 observes xi¤
¯ < ©¯(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g), he will be
indi®erent to accepting or rejecting any o®er xi¤
¯¡1. Following this argument till the ¯rst
player, Claim (a) is constructed.
Claim (b). For the game that starts at stage 2 there exist two types of SPE. One is that
at stage 2 player i¤ o®ers xi¤
j = ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) to all j 6= i¤ and, at stage 3, every
player j 6= i¤ accepts any o®er xi¤
j ¸ ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) and rejects the o®er otherwise.
The other is that at stage 2 the proposer o®ers xi¤
j · ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) to some players
j 6= i¤ and, at stage 3, any player j 2 Nnfi¤g rejects any o®er xi¤
j · ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g).
To verify the ¯rst type of SPE, one can check that the proposer has no incentive to increase
any o®er, given that all o®ers are no lower than ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) for all j 6= i¤, to a
level higher than ©l(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) to any particular player l 6= i¤, and see that in all








j and ©j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) + bi¤
j ,
respectively. One can readily understand the second type of SPE by seeing no payo® dif-
ference, compared to the ¯rst type of SPE, actually caused on the proposer and all other
8players when the o®er is rejected following the proposed strategies.4
Claim (c). In any SPE, Bi = Bj for all i;j 2 N, and hence Bi = 0 for all i 2 N.
Denote ­ = fi 2 NjBi = maxj2N(Bj)g. If ­ = N the claim is satis¯ed since
P
i2N Bi = 0.
Otherwise, we can show that any player i in ­ has the incentive to change her bids so as to
decrease the sum of payments in case she wins. Furthermore, these changes can be made
without altering the set ­. Hence, the player maintains the same probability of winning
and obtains a higher expected payo®. Take some player j = 2 ­. Let player i 2 ­ change
her strategy by announcing b0
k
i = bi
k + ² for all k 2 ­nfig, and b0
j
i = bi




l for all l = 2 ­ [ fjg. Then, the new net bids are B0i = Bi ¡ ², B0k = Bk ¡ ² for all
k 2 ­nfig, B0j = Bj + j­j² and B0l = Bl for all l = 2 ­ [ j. If ² is small enough so that
Bj + j­j² < Bi ¡ ², then B0l < B0i = B0k for all l 2 ­ (including j) and for all k 2 ­.
Therefore, ­ does not change. However,
P
h6=i bi




Claim (d). In any SPE, each player's payo® is the same regardless of whom is chosen as
the proposer.
This claim can be readily proved by contradiction. If some player can get extra payo®
given a speci¯c identity of the proposer, then this player will have incentive to adjust her
bids accordingly, which contradicts Claim (c).
Claim (e) In any SPE, the ¯nal payment received by each of the players coincides with the
payo® prescribed by the marginalistic rule of the game.








if she is the proposer, and will be ©i(Nnfjg;ujNnfjg)+ b
j
i in case of player j 6= i becoming



































4Note that the ¯rst type of SPE implies an agreement will form among all players in N whereas no
such an agreement will emerge in the second type of SPE. However, each player's ¯nal payo® remains the
same in both type of SPE.
9which, by Equation (2) and the fact that Bi = 0, equals jNj ¢ ©i(N;u). What remains is
obvious due to Claim (d).
As one can see, in order to obtain the marginalistic rule outcome in SPE the above
mechanism takes a rather extreme treatment on the proposer and the remaining players
with respect to the responsibilities of externalities: It requires the proposer chosen through
the bidding stage to fully assume the responsibility of the externalities (i.e., pays the other
players if she causes negative externalities to them and receives from the others if she
imposes positive externalities to them) in case her o®er is rejected.
Then, we might be curious about the possible result of an opposite argument: In case
of rejection the proposer is completely free from the responsibility for the externalities but
simply gets her status quo payo® and all other players continue in a similar fashion. This
leads to the following mechanism.
Mechanism B. This mechanism is the same as Mechanism A except the rule when an
o®er is rejected at stage 3. Here, if the o®er is rejected, the proposer i¤ leaves the game
with her status quo payo® u(i¤;N) from this stage, which implies that the proposer is not
supposed to be responsible for the externalities on the other players. Consequently, any
player j 6= i¤ will have to receive the externality u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g) besides the payo®
u(j;Nnfi¤g). That is, in case of proposer i¤'s o®er being rejected, any player j 6= i¤ will
still get u(j;N). Thus, all players other than i¤ proceed to play the subgame (Nnfi¤g;u¡i¤)
de¯ned by u¡i¤(j;S) = u(j;N) for S = Nnfi¤g and for all j 2 S, and u¡i¤(j;S) = u(j;S)




The ¯nal payo® to any player j 6= i¤ is the payo® he obtains in the game (Nnfi¤g;u¡i¤)
plus the bid bi¤
j .
Lemma 3.2 Mechanism B implements in SPE the status quo payo® vector of an arbitrary
primeval game (N;u).
Proof. The proof can be constructed along the same lines of that of Theorem 3.1. The
main di®erence lies in the construction of an SPE that yields the status quo payo® vector
as an SPE outcome:
At stage 1, each player i 2 N announces bi
j = u(j;N)¡u(j;N) = 0, for every j 2 Nnfig.
At stage 2, a proposer, player i¤, o®ers xi¤
j = u(j;N) to every j 2 Nnfig.
10At stage 3, any player j 2 Nnfi¤g accepts any o®er greater than or equal to u(j;N)
and rejects any o®er strictly smaller than u(j;N).
One can readily verify that these strategies yield the status quo payo® vector and they
constitute an SPE.
Comparing Mechanism A and Mechanism B, one can ¯nd that both of them take an
extreme treatment in terms of externality responsibility on the proposer (then also on the
other players) in case her o®er is rejected. Then, making a \fair" compromise between the
two seems reasonable and might be practical in reality, which leads to the following option.
Mechanism C. The mechanism is the same as Mechanism A except for the details re-
lated to the case when an o®er is rejected at stage 3. Now, suppose an o®er is rejected at
stage 3. Then, the proposer i¤ leaves the game and receives her status quo payo® u(i¤;N)
plus half of the externality e®ect of all other players, i.e., 1
2
P
j6=i¤ (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)),
from this stage. Meanwhile, each of the other players ¯rstly get half of the externali-
ties, i.e., 1
2 (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)) for all j 6= i¤, and then all of them proceed to play




j6=i¤ (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)) ¡
P
j6=i¤ bi¤
j , and the ¯nal payo® to any player
j 6= i¤ is the payo® he obtains in the game (Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) plus half of the externality gen-
erated by i¤, i.e., 1
2 (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)), and the bid bi¤
j . To make the rule clearer, sup-
pose that the next o®er by j¤ from the set of players Nnfi¤g is also rejected. Then, j¤ will
get u(j¤;Nnfi¤g) plus the half externality from i¤, i.e., 1
2(u(j¤;N)¡u(j¤;Nnfi¤g)) and half
of the externality e®ect to all other players 1
2
P
k2Nnfi¤;j¤g (u(k;Nnfi¤g) ¡ u(k;Nnfi¤;j¤g)).
Theorem 3.3 Mechanism C implements in SPE the outcome prescribed by the concession
rule of an arbitrary primeval game (N;u).
Proof. The proof is also analogous to that of Theorem 3.1. Therefore, below we only
explicitly construct an SPE that yields the concession rule outcome as an SPE outcome
for illustration:
At stage 1, each player i 2 N, announces
b
i







11for every j 2 Nnfig.5









to every j 2 Nnfig.








As is argued in Ju and Borm (2005), the primeval rule seems to ¯t the framework of
primeval games best. This can also be veri¯ed by the bidding approach in this paper. For
example, one might see a di±culty in applying Mechanism A into reality. That is, when
an o®er is rejected, the proposer i¤ will take the full responsibility for the externalities. It
is easy to accept that the proposer will compensate the negative externalities to the other
players. However, one might ¯nd hard to force the others to transfer the payo®s incurred
by the proposer's positive externalities back to her. Although the non-proposer players will
not pay such transfers to the proposer by Mechanism B, they will not be compensated for
negative externalities by the proposer either. To a certain extent, the concession rule may
help to overcome this problem as it makes a compromise. However, it seems more desirable
to have a mechanism that in case of an o®er being rejected the proposer will compensate
the others for negative externalities but the other need not give back the bene¯ts from the
positive externalities to her, which might be well accepted and applied in practice.
The following mechanism, which looks more complicated, indeed adopts the above idea
and implements the primeval rule.
Mechanism D. When an o®er is rejected at stage 3, the proposer i¤ will leave the game
whereas all remaining players proceed. In more detail, any player j 2 Nnfi¤g will get
maxfu(j;N)¡u(j;Nnfi¤g);0g and then get the outcome of the subgame (Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g)
played by the remaining players Nnfi¤g using the same rule as for the case with player set
N. Thus, the proposer i¤ leaves the game and receives u(i¤;N)+
P
j2Nnfi¤g minfu(j;N)¡
u(j;Nnfi¤g);0g from this stage. To further illustrate the mechanism. Suppose that the
next o®er by the second proposer j¤ is rejected again. Then, any player k 2 Nnfi¤;j¤g gets







. Then, together with Equation (2), one can readily check that
all net bids equal to zero.
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u(k;Nnfi¤;j¤g);0g from this stage.







³j(ujNnfig) + maxfu(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfig);0g
¢




³i(ujNnfjg) + maxfu(i;N) ¡ u(i;Nnfjg);0g
¢
for all i;j 2 N.
























³i(ujNnfjg) + maxfu(i;N) ¡ u(i;Nnfjg);0g
¢
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³i(ujNnfjg) + maxfu(i;N) ¡ u(i;Nnfjg);0g
¢
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³i(ujNnfjg) + maxfu(i;N) ¡ u(i;Nnfjg);0g
¢
:
Theorem 3.5 Mechanism D implements in SPE the outcome prescribed by the primeval
rule of an arbitrary primeval game (N;u).
Proof.
The proof is, again, analogous to that for Theorem 3.1. the di®erence lies in the construc-
tion of the SPE strategies and in Claim (e). Here, we explicitly construct an SPE that
yields the primeval rule outcome and show that the Claim (e) (that payo®s must coincide
with the payo®s prescribed by the primeval rule) holds as well.
To construct an SPE yielding the primeval rule outcome consider the following strategies.
At stage 1, each player i 2 N announces
b
i
j = ³j(N;u) ¡
¡
³j(Nnfig;ujNnfig) + maxfu(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfig);0g
¢
;
for every j 2 Nnfig.




¤g;ujNnfi¤g) + maxfu(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi
¤g);0g
to every j 2 Nnfig.
At stage 3, any player j 2 Nnfig accepts any o®er that is greater than or equal to
³j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g)+ maxfu(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g);0g and rejects any o®er strictly smaller
than ³j(Nnfi¤g;ujNnfi¤g) + maxfu(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g);0g.
To show that in any SPE each player's ¯nal payo® must coincide with her payo® prescribed



















14and in case of player j 6= i becoming the proposer her ¯nal payo® will be
³i(Nnfjg;ujNnfjg) + maxfu(i;N) ¡ u(i;Nnfjg);0g + b
j
i:













































which, by the fact that Bi = 0 and Lemma 3.4, can be shown to equal jNj¢³i(N;u). What
remains is obvious due to Claim (d).
Below we provide an extension on the game design to implement these compensa-
tion rules. In the mechanism to implement the outcome prescribed by the marginalis-
tic rule, holding other details unchanged, we reduce the payo® to the rejected proposer
i¤ from u(i¤;N) +
P
j6=i¤ (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)) to any arbitrary level µi¤ · u(i¤;N) +
P
j6=i¤ (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)) by taking the decrease as a punishment to i¤ for making
an unacceptable o®er, while the rest of the players still get
P
j6=i¤(u(j;N) from this stage
if they reach an agreement among them. A more general description is that if the game
continues, after all preceding o®ers being rejected, to the set of players S ½ N, and the
corresponding o®er made by the proposer i¤







Sg (u(k;S) ¡ u(k;Snfi¤
Sg)) from this stage and the remaining play-
ers continue in the same fashion. This mechanism also implements the marginalistic rule of
an arbitrary primeval game (N;u) in SPE. However, we note that in this case, only the ¯rst
type of SPE exists in Claim (b) if we have µi¤ < u(i¤;N)+
P
j6=i¤ (u(j;N) ¡ u(j;Nnfi¤g)).
One can readily adapt this idea to other mechanisms and implement the corresponding
compensation rules.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we discuss a non-cooperative approach to the compensation rules for primeval
games. Having the same basic bidding stage, we design di®erent ending rules such that in
15case of an o®er being rejected, the proposer is required to assume di®erent responsibilities
for the externalities and make the corresponding compensations. In order to implement
the marginalistic rule, we require the proposer to assume the full responsibility of the
externalities, which implies that if she is rejected all other players should get what they
would have as if the proposer does not exist. An opposite view will lead to implementing the
status quo payo® vector. Making a compromise between the two results in a mechanism to
implement the concession rule. Finally, the primeval rule is implemented via a mechanism
following a practical principle: In case of a proposal being rejected, the proposer will have
to compensate all other players if she causes negative externalities on them but cannot
receive compensation from the others even if she generates positive externalities. We show
that these results hold for any primeval game.
On the applied side, the mechanisms proposed in the paper can help to resolve the real-
life compensation problems. Theoretically, this study highlights the di®erence between the
compensation rules from a strategic viewpoint and makes the analysis of the issue more
speci¯c. This issue can be further addressed by constructing alternative mechanisms to
implement these rules. For a primeval game with all positive externalities among the players
and that their total payo®s are monotonic with respect to the size of player group, one can
adapt the \re-negotiation" bidding mechanism proposed by Ju and Wettstein (2006) to
obtain alternative mechanisms to implement these rules. In Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004), a
two-level bidding mechanism is discussed to implement the consensus value for TU games
by introducing an exogenously given probability parameter. One can also readily apply
this idea to construct a mechanism to implement the concession rule.
As is seen from the above, di®erent ending rules may result in di®erent equilibrium
outcomes. Therefore, following the basic bidding game, one can look into other reasonable
possibilities in terms of externality compensation when the proposer is rejected and con-
struct new bidding mechanisms. That would lead to new compensation rules, which, in
return, calls for the axiomatic study. Hence, the approach in the paper can help to bridge
the two di®erent perspectives about the issue and gain further insights.
We want to point out that a primeval game usually assumes that the status quo, i.e., all
players exist in the game, is the ¯nal state of a game. If we relax such a condition and allow
players to negotiate with each other by compensation to form e±cient group structures,
then the existing approaches are not adequate, which suggests a future research topic.
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